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ABSTRACT
Crowdsourcing via paid microtasks has been successfully applied
in a plethora of domains and tasks. Previous efforts for making
such crowdsourcing more effective have considered aspects as di-
verse as task and workflow design, spam detection, quality control,
and pricing models. Our work expands upon such efforts by exam-
ining the potential of adding gamification to microtask interfaces
as a means of improving both worker engagement and effective-
ness. We run a series of experiments in image labeling, one of the
most common use cases for microtask crowdsourcing, and analyse
worker behavior in terms of number of images completed, qual-
ity of annotations compared against a gold standard, and response
to financial and game-specific rewards. Each experiment studies
these parameters in two settings: one based on a state-of-the-art,
non-gamified task on CrowdFlower and another one using an al-
ternative interface incorporating several game elements. Our find-
ings show that gamification leads to better accuracy and lower costs
than conventional approaches that use only monetary incentives. In
addition, it seems to make paid microtask work more rewarding
and engaging, especially when sociality features are introduced.
Following these initial insights, we define a predictive model for
estimating the most appropriate incentives for individual workers,
based on their previous contributions. This allows us to build a
personalised game experience, with gains seen on the volume and
quality of work completed.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
algorithms, experimentation, theory
Keywords
crowdsourcing, microtasks, gamification, incentives engineering
1. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing offers a powerful and scalable way of outsourcing
knowledge-intensive tasks to a large group of remote contributors
over the Internet. Eight years since the concept was first introduced
[10], it seems to have found global adoption; virtually any indus-
try, science discipline, or public sector agency could tell a story
about how they reached out to the wisdom of the crowds to im-
prove their services and react more flexibly to customer demand,
run comprehensive data collection and analysis projects, or collect
ideas and views for a better informed policy making [3]. However,
with every such success story, it has also become apparent that run-
ning crowdsourcing projects effectively is not straightforward and
requires in-depth insight into a wide range of topics, including in-
terface design, statistical data analysis, and incentives engineering
[15, 16].
One of the most popular forms of online crowdsourcing are paid
microtasks. People have tried to understand how to make micro-
task projects more effective, looking at aspects as diverse as task
and workflow design, spam detection, quality control, and pricing
models. Our work shares similar aims. We explore the use of gami-
fication in combination with paid microtasks as a means to improve
both task performance and worker experience.
We run a series of experiments in image labeling, one of the most
common use cases for paid microtask crowdsourcing1 on platforms
such as Amazon Mechanical Turk2 and CrowdFlower3, and analyse
worker behavior in terms of number of images completed, quality
of annotations compared against a golden standard, as well as mon-
etary and game-specific rewards. Each experiment studies these
parameters in two settings: one based on a state-of-the-art, non-
gamified ’job’ on CrowdFlower (i.e., the unit of work on this plat-
form); and another one using an alternative interface incorporat-
ing several game elements. The second setting uses CrowdFlower
as well, but only to seek contributors; it offers the same reward
for the same amount of work as the baseline task, but points to an
external page where the gamified version of the task is deployed.
More specifically, in the second condition, CrowdFlower work-
ers are asked to engage with a game-with-a-purpose (GWAP) [27]
1See also http://www.behind-the-enemy-lines.
com/2010/10/what-tasks-are-posted-on-mechanical.
html.
2Amazon Mechanical Turk - https://www.mturk.com
3CrowdFlower - http://www.crowdflower.com
called Wordsmith, which was developed for the purpose of these
experiments.4
When creating Wordsmith, our primary focus was not on coming
up with a fundamentally novel game experience to collect image
labels, but on building an experimental framework to test our re-
search hypotheses regarding the interplay between monetary and
gamification-centric rewards. Overall, our design choices were
guided by the four traits that define games: a goal, rules, a feed-
back system, and voluntary participation [21]. The game elements
we implemented are some of the most common in the literature
[31]: points, levels, leaderboards, and badges. These components
provide feedback and reinforcement, while helping workers judge
their progress relative to the end-goal of the task, as well as relative
to other workers. We also included progress bars and alerts, which
informed on their proximity to level goals. Finally, we put in place
elements that enforced the game rules, for example, modules that
check for spam, duplicates, and non-English words.
Our basic hypothesis is that by designing a playful interface for
the image labeling task - as opposed to the functional style com-
mon to most microtask platforms - we will encourage workers to
engage with the task more, independently of the actual monetary
reward. This hypothesis was confirmed by our findings, which re-
vealed better accuracy (an improvement of almost 10% compared
to the baseline condition) and significantly lower costs per anno-
tated image (5,708 unique labels collected via the game vs. 111
unique labels contributed through equivalent, non-gamified micro-
tasks, see Experiment 1 in Section 5). We tested this hypothesis on
different variations of image labeling tasks, in which we increased
the complexity of the task and adjusted the prices accordingly, ob-
serving a similar trend.
Then we looked into the impact of different game elements and
related incentives on the behavior of the workers, following the
SAPS framework (Status, Access, Power, Stuff) presented by [31].
Besides studying how people responded to the primary gamifica-
tion components (leaderboard, levels, points, and badges), we also
introduced a sociality aspect, which was originally missing from
the game and allowed contributors to view each others’ achieve-
ments. Our final incentive dimension was additional cash payment
for more work, once the goals of the initial task had been achieved.
These new experiments produced clear evidence of the positive ef-
fects of game mechanics on both task performance and crowd en-
gagement; up to five times more unique labels were generated while
preserving a comparable level of accuracy (see Experiment 2 in
Section 5). This is true particularly for sociality features, which are
largely absent on microtask platforms.
Following these insights, we went on to create a predictive model
that estimates the most suitable set of incentives for individual work-
ers, based on their previous contributions. This allowed us to build
a personalized game experience, with positive results on the vol-
ume and quality of work completed. With this model, we were able
to obtain 19% more concordant image keywords (4849 vs. 4091)
while maintaining the same average pair-wise agreement score. We
also recorded a significant uptake in image tagging (with 77% of
players tagging an extra image when confronted with targeted in-
centives against 27% in the experiments using a randomly selected
incentive).
4Wordsmith - http://seyi.feyisetan.com/wordsmith
Overall, the results of these experiments shed light on possible de-
sign improvements of paid microtasks environments in order to
achieve better task performance and make the overall experience
more fair and rewarding for the workers. While we are not nec-
essarily arguing for a fully-fledged gamification of microtask plat-
forms, considering specific game mechanics [31], or in fact, any
social design features that are widely discussed on online commu-
nities literature [17] is worth further investigations. This is impor-
tant not just for purely utilitarian motives on the side of the task
requesters, but also in the context of the ongoing debate on ethical
and fair crowdsourcing [11].
Previous work has approached such aspects through studies of crowd
motivations [14], discussing the rich repertoire of extrinsic and in-
trinsic reasons that drive people to contribute to microtask projects.
Our experiments quantify some of these insights. We deliberately
chose a task that is well-known in the crowdsourcing literature, as
we were aiming for task-independent findings, which were only
minimally influenced by interface or quality control aspects. For
the same reasons, we opted for average market prices to reward
participation; lower pays would have been less attractive (and un-
fair) for workers, higher ones might have appealed to people who
were primarily financially incentivised. We believe more research
needs to be done to build microtask platforms that reflect and sup-
port the values and motivations of the crowd as an integral part of
their functionality. Our experiments give evidence that such efforts
could be be beneficial both workers, and for requesters.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly review some of the most relevant prior
work pertaining to maximising the effectiveness of incentivised
crowdsourcing. In particular, we focus on approaches that use
game mechanics in human computation, and on methods that aim
to optimize the performance of crowd workers, be that by offering
bespoke incentives, or by assigning tasks to those workers who are
likely to be able or willing to complete them accurately. As much
of this background literature is inspired by, and explained using,
theories of human motivation, we touch on fundamental work in
that space as well.
2.1 Motivation and incentives
While efforts at designing successful crowdsourcing projects have
considered a variety of dimensions, including end-user interfaces,
spam detection, and quality control, some of the most influential
works in recent crowdsourcing literature have approached this prob-
lem by looking at crowd engagement. This is seen as an effective
way to achieve better productivity and ensure the sustainability of
crowdsourcing platforms over time. Research on crowd engage-
ment covers various aspects, from studies of motivations of con-
tributors to specific projects to applications of theoretical models
from economics to the newer scenarios of online labor markets.
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation Frameworks such as the Self
Determination Theory [4] make the distinction between intrin-
sic and extrinsic motivation to study the reasons why individuals
decide to contribute to a task. The former covers those types of
tasks which are perceived as interesting, enjoyable, or rewarding
in themselves, and is seen as responsible for engagement in many
on and off-line activities, including reading books, socialisation, or
participation in virtual worlds and volunteering projects. Extrinsic
motives, by contrast, are related to factors that are not inherently
related to the actual task, but are appealing for some external rea-
son such as status or reputation within a group. Equally powerful,
they underpin a fair share of our contributions to social networks,
discussion forums, or community projects.
Theories of external reward and incentivisation
Yet for many classes of tasks, the most reliable way for getting
crowd workers engaged remains through explicit external rewards,
in particular monetary payment [13]. However, studies have shown
that such models are no guarantee for effective crowdsourcing. Where
in some cases higher rewards are likely to expedite task completion,
they do not necessarily lead to an improved worker performance
and attract more spammers [20, 19, 30]. Such scenarios have to
consider anchoring effects, caused by discrepancies between per-
ceived work value and actual remuneration, and drop-off effects,
where they stop after hitting their self-defined targets no matter how
high the additional gains might be [20, 30].
Gamification and its effects Gamification refers to “the use of
game design elements in non-game contexts” [7]. It often includes
adding game-like rewards, and may also include competitive and
social elements, such as leaderboards, explicit competitions, as well
as group and individual performance feedback to encourage en-
gagement. Many projects have already demonstrated substantial
success in applying this idea to crowdsourcing settings; this applies
most prominently for games-with-a purpose (GWAPs) [27], which
build a game narrative around human computation tasks such as
image labeling [26], protein folding,5 or language translation.6
Similarly to the concerns raised in the context of external rewards
and incentivisation [18], gamification has been seen, in some con-
text, to undermine intrinsic benefits by subjugating and trivialising
contributions into simple game goals and achievements.7 This ef-
fect has been called overjustification and has been the subject of
various studies with intriguing results; while some negative effects
of overjustification have been recurrently reproduced, current re-
search acknowledges the fact that its prevalence seems to be highly
dependent on context and that, in most cases, extrinsic rewards
complement rather than hamper intrinsic motivations for partici-
pating [5, 22].
Comparative studies
Several works have explored such effects by undertaking compar-
ative studies of different forms of crowdsourcing to solve specific
tasks. In [25] the authors analysed paid microtasks and a game-
with-a-purpose to build a conceptual schema from topics of Wikipedia
articles. They reported similar levels of task performance for both
approaches, and were concerned by the costs associated with the
development and maintenance of a sustainable community of GWAP
players. Similarly, a comparison of a purely gamified environ-
ment (with no monetary reward) vs standard paid microtasks by
Jurgens et al. showed that while comparable quality was achieved
from both conditions, the former yielded an overall cost savings
(when game development costs were factored in) of 63% overall to
achieve task completion [12]. However, the cost savings came at
an expense of timely completion; results from the paid microtask
platforms were completed in hours, while results from the game
approach (Puzzle Racer) trickled in over two weeks.
Meanwhile, a few previous studies have also looked at supplement-
ing monetary reward with gamification, as we do in this paper. A
5Fold It - http://fold.it
6Duolingo - https://www.duolingo.com/
7Criticisms of Gamification - http://radar.oreilly.
com/gamification-criticism
study of crowdsourced judgements on relevance assessments and
clustering compared traditional HITs and gamified HITs across the
dimensions of quality (compared against a gold standard), effi-
ciency (time required to collect judgements) and incentives (finan-
cial vs fun)[8]. Their results show that adding gamification yielded
quicker judgements at a higher quality over purely financial incen-
tives. Our work offers a more in-depth study of different types of
incentives, alongside a model to predict the most effective type of
reward. Other relevant studies in literature include a comparison of
crowd-based, game-based, and machine-based approaches by [9].
2.2 Methods to make crowdsourcing more ef-
fective
While in the previous section we primarily looked at prior stud-
ies of motivation and incentives aspects in particular scenarios, we
will now give an overview of methods which help make crowd-
sourcing projects more effective by optimizing key components of
such projects.
A number of descriptive frameworks have been proposed in the
literature to capture the nuances of incentives engineering beyond
simplistic ’fun or money’ considerations. Some of these include
MICE (Money, Ideology, Coercion, Excitement) [2], RASCLS (Re-
ciprocation, Authority, Scarcity, Commitment, Liking, Social Proof)
[2], and SAPS [31]. SAPS represents Status, Access, Power and
Stuff, intended to represent a system of incentives from the most
desired to the least desired, and the cheapest to the most expensive.
We adopted this framework in our experiments.
Mechanisms for effective allocation of incentives have been stud-
ied in market and auction platforms, wireless and peer-to-peer net-
works and corporate organisations. In the context of crowdsourc-
ing, a number of studies have been carried out, applying game-
theory techniques to incentive design [28, 29]. These two pieces
of work focus on financial incentives and a premise of inter-player
strategy dependency. Not all crowdsourcing tasks can be modelled
in this way; we adopt a probabilistic approach based on prior player
behaviours to predict appropriate incentives beyond the purely fi-
nancial. Similar techniques are used for various purposes in crowd-
sourcing design, in particular to inform the assignment of tasks to
workers or to predict task completion [6, 24].
A large body of work has been dedicated to task and workflow de-
sign, as well as quality control (see, for instance, [23] for a recent
compilation). We take their findings into account when implement-
ing the basic interfaces published on CrowdFlower as well as the
means to check quality and validate results.
3. CROWDSOURCING IMAGE LABELING:
OUR APPROACH
In this section, we introduce a high level overview of our approach
to crowdsource image labeling. We present our microtask design
model and strategies for undertaking crowd work. This involves the
use of an external platform, CrowdFlower, and our bespoke game
Wordsmith.
3.1 Task model
We now describe our model for maximising the output from crowd
assigned tasks while maintaining quality.
Task. Each HIT (Human Intelligence Task) consists of n images,
x = {x1, ..., xn}, which can each be described by a set of m key-
words k = {k1, ..., km}, where m is a large unknown number.
Each task seeks to capture new keywords that correctly describes
each image.
Requester. The requester desires to have as many image annota-
tions as possible, without compromising on the quality of the de-
scribing keywords. The requester requires the help of human agents
to carry out the tasks.
Strategy. We define two requester strategies for presenting tasks.
The crowd strategy relies on traditional crowdsourcing techniques
in a standard "image field - text fields" layout. The game strategy
employs game mechanisms, and a game based interface to capture
keywords. Our nomenclature defines human agents in the crowd
strategy as workers, and those in the game as players.
Crowd→Worker. Each worker provides judgement on a task by
assigning m keywords {k1, ..., km} to n images {x1, ..., xn} in a
traditional crowdsourcing system. We used CrowdFlower as our
crowdsourcing platform, presenting each task using the standard
image annotation template provided. In this strategy, n and m are
defined and fixed by the requester.
Game→ Player. Each player provides judgements on a task in a
fashion similar to workers in the crowd strategy. However, in the
game strategy, players can tag a variable number of images as they
progress through more levels.
Quality. Is defined by consensus. The number of keywords match-
ing a quasi-gold standard bank, gives an overview of the quality of
annotations. This was extended to also cover consensual annota-
tions within workers and players - as this suggests probable new
keywords for the image.
3.2 Recruitment
We sourced all our human agents from CrowdFlower. For each
experiment, we created 2 jobs which channelled task resources to
the crowd strategy and game strategy. We used identical settings
for each experiment set, consisting of the following parameters:
Geography - limited to the top 15 English speaking countries, and
the top CrowdFlower contributor countries.
Skills - we chose Level 2 Contributors, which account for 36% of
monthly judgements.
Judgements - 3 per unit, which meant each image would be anno-
tated by at least 3 human agents.
Behaviour - each human agent was paid for 1 task, i.e., paid to tag
m images, with n keywords, each as determined by the requester.
For this, CrowdFlower tracks the IPs and aliases created by the
agents.
Reward/Time Limits - reward payment and completion time lim-
its were experimentally set as described later.
3.3 Game design
We designed an image-labelling game called Wordsmith for our
experimental game conditions. The design was heavily borrowed
from the ESP game, with variations described below. The basic el-
ements of Wordsmith consisted of an image frame and text fields
for inputting keywords. We describe Wordsmith in terms of the
four defining properties of games [21]) as follows: its goal, rules,
feedback mechanisms and participation.
Game goal
The goal of the game was to annotate as many images as possible
(up to the maximum in the dataset) with descriptive keywords. In
designing Wordsmith, we incorporated several elements to engage
the player in achieving the goal. We added a colour coded progress
timer on each image task and progress bars to track level comple-
tion. We also incorporated feed forward alerts to nudge players on
when a goal (such as the next level or a new badge) is within reach.
Rules and constraints
Due to the simplicity of Wordsmith as an image labeling game, the
rules of Wordsmith merely consist of constraints designed to pre-
vent cheating and input from spam-bots. These constraints consist
of a service based English word verification, a restricted-word list
to ban common words as players advanced through levels, dupli-
cate checking, and a simple CAPTCHA-like question (e.g. ’What
is the current day of the week?’) after every 10 image labeling
rounds to filter automated processes.
Feedback mechanisms
Feedback consists of information provided to players on their progress
and current standing in the game. Providing feedback has been
shown to improve player retention and engagement by enhancing
intrinsic feelings of accomplishment as players advance. Both so-
cial and non-social feedback elements were added to Wordsmith as
follows:
1. Leaderboard - showed the hourly scores and level of the top
5 players.
2. Levels - the game consisted of a total of 9 levels from Newbie
to Wordsmith. A player’s level advancement was a function
of how many images were tagged.
3. Badges - were awarded based on the number of images tagged.
4. Feedback Alerts - informed a player how a bonus point or
badge was attained and how it can be re-attained.
5. Bonus Points - were awarded when players submitted key-
words that matched 1, 2, or 3 known images tags.
6. Treasure Points - were awarded when players got multiples
of 10 bonus points.
7. Activities Widget - displayed in realtime, what other players
were doing in the game.
Voluntary participation
The final trait was to present the task within the game as what the
player chose to do rather than what they were mandated to do. In
this regard, Wordsmith supported player freedom in three ways;
first, participation of course was purely optional and anonymous,
and they could join without registering (filling out a form or pro-
viding any personal details). Second, players could terminate at
any time; finally, an image skip feature was provided so they could
freely skip images they were not interested in.
3.4 Furtherance incentives
In Experiment 2, we introduce "furtherance incentives" to Condi-
tions 3 and 4, which is a reward or concession presented to a player
when they attempt to exit the game to induce them to stay and play
more levels. We selected our incentives based on the SAPS frame-
work presented by [31].
In our experiment, we expanded Status from SAPS to encompass
the 3 game status elements mentioned by [31], i.e., badges, leader-
board and levels. We interpreted the SAPS incentives as a popup
messages presented to the player at the point of attempted exit.
Each incentive began with the message: Would you like to tag the
next "target number" images? If the player had tagged less than 21
images, the "target number" of additional images was 5, otherwise
it was 11.
The specific messages appended to each incentive is as follows:
• Badges - You would automatically be rewarded with The
’Ultimate’ Badge. Get upgraded to a shiny new avatar
• Leaderboard - You would automatically be advanced on
The Global Leaderboard. Get seen globally on the leader-
board
• Levels - You would automatically be advanced to The Next
Level. Advance to the next level.
• Access - You would be given quicker access to Treasure Points.
Get more treasure in half the time.
• Power - You would be rewarded with the power to View
Other Players Tags. Power to see other players image tags.
• Stuff - You would be rewarded with a bonus of 5 cents extra.
More cash for your effort.
At each point of attempted exit, a player was shown one of the 6
furtherance incentives
V = {badges, leaderboard, levels, access, power,money}
The choice of the incentive to be shown was decided by drawing a
random variable V v U([0, 1])
At the moment of incentive offer, we record the incentive offered,
the requested target number, the number of images tagged so far
(as start_tags and end_tags) and the current timestamp. We then
recorded the player’s game state after the incentive was presented
i.e., the player could ignore the incentive and exit the game (state=out),
or the player could go on playing the game (state=in).
If the player remains in state = in, we keep track of game play
(updating the number of images tagged as end_tags) until the player
has tagged an additional "target images". At this point, the offered
incentive is activated. Players can then transition into state in or
out. If a player attempts to exit the game at this point, we do not
show any furtherance incentive. However, if the player remains
in the game, we continue to keep track of the number of images
tagged, and therefore update the value for end_tags.
3.5 Adjusting incentives probabilistically
In the final condition (Experiment 4), we posit that certain further-
ance incentives are more effective at different stages of gameplay.
To test this hypothesis, we computed a probabilistic model that es-
timates, at every potential game exit point, the incentive that would
maximize the probability of the player remaining in the game. To
do this, our probabilsitic model computes a priori state transitions
at previous attempted exit points, to predict what incentive a player
would accept given the number of images they have tagged. This
model is computed from:
1. the prior probability of the incentive given the incentive dis-
tribution obtained from the results of the random incentives
condition (Experiment 4 Condition 3)
2. the likelihood probability of the player remaining in the game
after tagging the current number of images given a certain of-
fered incentive and
3. the likelihood probability of the player remaining in the game
after tagging a set of images (defined over a numeric range),
given a certain offered incentive.
The details of the reasoning approach is detailed in the next few
sections.
Our probabilistic reasoning approach to computing the maximum
a posteriori incentive given our selected feature (the number of
tagged images) is similar to the method of determining the cor-
rectness of worker results by [6].
We compute the posterior as the maximum conditional probability
of the incentive v at a given point x using Bayesian inferencing as
shown in the equation below:
Pr(v|x, s = in) = Pr(x|v, s = in) Pr(v|s = in)
Pr(x|s = in) (1)
where:
v is a potential incentive to be shown to the player.
x is the number of images a player has tagged so far.
s is the state of a player being in or out of the game.
Pr(v|x,s=in) is the posterior of the incentive given the number of
images the player has tagged.
Pr(v|s=in) is the prior probability of the incentive i.e., the probabil-
ity of any player at any given point accepting this incentive.
Pr(x|v,s=in) is the likelihood at the current game point that the
player would accept the given incentive.
3.5.1 Definitions
Image point
x ∈ X = {1, ..., N}whereN = 2, 200.
Represents the number of images a player has tagged at the point
of an attempted game exit.
Game states
s ∈ S = {out, in}
Represents the state a game player is in after attempting to exit the
game at an image point.
Incentive
v ∈ V = {badges, leaderboard, levels, access, power,money}
Represents the set of incentives from which v is drawn to be pre-
sented to the player at the point of attempted exit.
Image Band
b = (xi, xj) = {b ∈ R | xi < b < xj}
Represents a range over image points xi to xj over which players
exhibit similar exit pattern behaviours.
3.5.2 Prior distributions
Our prior distributions come from the results of random incentives
presented to players. We compute the objective prior of the incen-
tive v as given by the sum and product rule in Bayes Theorem:
Pr(v|s = in) =
N∑
x=1
Pr(s = in|v, x)
N∑
x=1
V∑
v∈V
Pr(s = in|v, x)
(2)
This represents the number of players that remained in state s = in,
at image point x after being shown incentive v over all image points
x ∈ X, compared with all the players that remained in state s = in,
at image point x after being shown any incentive v in the set of all
incentives V over all image points x ∈ X.
As an example, given that 100 players remained in state s = in after
they were shown any incentive v ∈ V over all image points x ∈ X
= {1, ..., 2,200}. If 29 of such players (who remained in the game)
were shown incentive v = "power", then the prior of the incentive
"power" over all image points is 29/100 or 29%.
3.5.3 Likelihood distributions
We also compute the likelihood at each image point x, of a worker
remaining in state s = in given an incentive v. The likelihood rep-
resents the conditional probability
P (x|v, s = in)
at image point x. Our likelihood function was a product of 2 vari-
ables: (a) the image point likelihood and (b) the image band likeli-
hood.
Image point likelihood
For each incentive v, we calculate the image point likelihood at
point x as:
Pr(x|v, s = in) = Pr(s = in, x|v)
S∑
s∈S
Pr(s, x|v)
(3)
This represents how many players remained in state s = in, at image
point x after being shown incentive v at image point x, compared
with all observations of state changes at image point x after being
shown incentive v.
As an example, given that 3 players attempted to stop playing the
game after tagging 11 images (image point x = 11) and the 3 players
were all shown the incentive v = "power". If 2 of the players go on
to tag the 12th image, then we calculate the likelihood of a player
remaining in state s=in, at the 11th image, when shown "power" as
2/3.
For image points where we do not have any observed behaviours,
i.e., where no player had attempted to exit the game at a certain
image point x, we apply the principle of indifference (principle of
maximum entropy) to accommodate these latent variables.
P (x|v, s = in) = 1/N ∀ x ∈ N = {1, ..., N} (4)
The variable x here represents the image point while N = 2, repre-
senting 2 possible states s = {in, out}. Therefore, for unobserved
image points,
P (x|v, s = in) = P (s = in) = P (s = out) = 0.5 (5)
Image band likelihoods
To further accommodate for latent variables and present an expres-
sive picture of how players behave after tagging a certain numbered
range of images, we introduced image band likelihoods.
Image Band
b = (xi, xj) = {b ∈ R | xi < b < xj}
Represents a range over image points xi to xj over which players
exhibit similar exit pattern behaviours.
The image bands b ∈ B were elicited by observations over the re-
sults from the randomised incentive condition and they are:
B = {0− 11, 12− 60, 61− 100, 101− 200, 201− 2200}
The image band likelihoods were computed on an incentives basis,
as such:
B∑
b∈B
Pr(s = in, b|v) = 1 (6)
For each incentive v, we calculate the image band likelihood over
band b as:
Pr(b|v, s = in) = Pr(s = in, b|v)
S∑
s∈S
Pr(s, b|v)
(7)
This represents how many players remained in state s = in, within
image band b, after being shown incentive v, compared with all
players who remained in state s = in, over all image bands b ∈ B,
after being shown incentive v.
As an example, given that 100 players remained in state s = in after
they were shown incentive v = "power" over all image points x ∈
X = 1, ..., 2,200. If 16 players go on to tag 1 more image within
the range of image points xi, xj = (12,60) = 12 < b < 60, then the
image band likelihood of "12-60" given incentive v = "power" is
16/100 or 16%.
3.5.4 Updating the likelihoods
As the experiment runs, we continuously take into account the be-
haviour of players at each image point. With each new observa-
tion at an image point, we recalculate the likelihood of remain-
ing in state s = in, at image point x after being shown incentive
v. Therefore, our probabilistic model iteratively updates the like-
lihoods by constantly learning and taking into account new data
based on player interaction. This is of particular importance in fill-
ing in revised parameters for the earlier unobserved image points.
As an example, given an image point x = 20, where there had been
no earlier observations in experiment 4 of a player exit after being
shown incentive v = "power". The image point likelihood would be
assigned the default of 0.5 (principle of maximum entropy), com-
puted as 2 observations with 1 observation at state s = in. If a new
observation occurs (for any given player) at the image point x =
20 for incentive v = "power" and the player transitions to state s =
out, the image point likelihood is updated to 3 observations with 1
observation at state s = in = 0.33.
3.5.5 Computing the posteriors
Given the incentive prior P(v|s=in) when a player remains in the
game, the image point likelihood Pr(x|v, s = in) and the image
band likelihood Pr(b|v, s = in), we are able to compute the best
incentive to offer a player at image point x as the incentive that
maximizes the posterior given as
argmax
v
Pr(v|x) = Pr(j|v, s = in) Pr(v|s = in) (8)
where the joint likelihood of the image point and the image band is
given as:
Pr(j|v, s = in) = Pr(x|v, s = in) Pr(b|v, s = in)
The incentive is then offered to the player and the ensuing state
transition is recorded as a new observation point to update the im-
age point likelihood given that incentive.
3.5.6 Algorithms
We now present the algorithm for the image point likelihoods for an
incentive and the algorithm for calculating the incentive posteriors
at any given image point.
Result: Likelihood P(x|v) = inx/obv
Parameter: v = incentive;
Initialize Latent Variables;
Image Points: x = {1,...,N};
Observations at x: obv = 2;
State = in at x: inx = 1;
for x in Image Points do
if state = in at x then
obv += 1;
inx += 1;
else
obv += 1;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Image point likelihoods for incentive v
Result: Posterior Incentive: argmaxv Pr(v|x)
Parameter: x = image point;
Initialize Latent Variables;
Incentive v at x: vx = {};
Posteriors Tracker: pt = {levels = 0, ..., power = 0};
Min Tags: min = 11;
Max Tags: max = 2,200;
for image tag x from min to max do
Pr(v|x) ∀ v ∈ V ;
Pr(v|x) = Pr(v).Pr(b|v).Pr(x|v);
Incentive Identifier iid = 0;
Selected Incentive vx = Pr(v|x) at iid;
Update Posteriors Tracker ptatvx+ = 1;
Max Incentive Assignment mia = Pr(v) ∗ (max−min) if
pt at vx < mia then
return vx;
else
return vx = Pr(v|x) at iid + 1;
end
end
Algorithm 2: Incentive posteriors at image point x
4. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
This section details the experiments we carried out. We ran 2 ex-
periments. Experiment 1 had 2 conditions - (a) CrowdFlower (non
gamified) condition; (b) Wordsmith (gamified) condition. Experi-
ment 2 had 4 conditions - (a) Non gamified condition; (b) Gamified
condition (without furtherance incentives); (c) Gamified condition
(with random furtherance incentives); (d) Gamified condition (with
targeted furtherance incentives).
4.1 Research hypotheses
Our work was centered around 3 potential ways in which gamifica-
tion can be used to improve paid microtasks:
1. Gamifying paid micro-tasks leads to increased worker en-
gagement, culminating in more work done for less cost.
2. Gamifying paid micro-tasks leads to higher inter-annotator
agreement, yielding higher quality results than without.
3. Targeting incentives when a player attempts to quit leads to
increased engagement.
To test these hypothesis, we carried out 2 experiments in image
labelling. Workers were shown an image, and asked to assign
keywords that describe the image. To test the first two hypothe-
ses, we chose a between-subjects design where the control condi-
tion consisted of a standard, non-gamified interface, using Crowd-
Flower’s image labelling job; while the experimental condition,
consisted of a gamified interface incorporating several game ele-
ments. Both conditions relied on CrowdFlower for worker recruit-
ment, but while workers performed tasks directly within Crowd-
Flower for the control condition, workers assigned the experimen-
tal were redirected to an external game site. Participants in both
setups were paid the same amount.
To test the 3rd hypothesis, we carried out 2 additional condition se-
tups on our gamified interface, again with players sourced and redi-
rected from CrowdFlower. In the control condition, workers were
shown a randomly-selected incentive to stay when they attempted
to leave the game. In the experimental condition, an incentive was
shown selected based upon a predictive model constructed from the
previous worker’s task history. The details of this predictive model
was presented earlier in Section 3.5.
4.2 Dataset
For our experiments, we used the ESP game dataset from [26]. This
comprises of 100,000 images and about 1.4 million image tags. For
each experiment, we selected the images in the dataset which had
the highest number of keyword tags associated with it. This was
used as a sort of quasi-ground truth, for checking basic tagging
quality and assigning bonus points.
4.3 Evaluation metrics
To evaluate worker performance, we measured both the volume of
work completed and work quality. To assess the volume of work
completed, we simply measured the average number of keywords
provided per image. To assess work quality, we used two measures:
overlap with the gold standard keywords in the dataset, and a stan-
dard measure of inter-annotator agreement from [1] to determine
the degree of the pairwise consensus of image labels which were
not in the gold standard datset.
For Experiment 2 condition 4, we sought to evaluate the effective-
ness of targeted incentives over random ones. To do this, we used
as a measure the number of players that tagged at least 1 more im-
age after they were shown each particular incentive. The incentive
was shown when they attempted to stop playing the game.
4.4 Experimental conditions
In this section, we summarise both experiments and their condi-
tions in detail.
Experiment 1: Task: Tag 1 Image with at least 2 keywords; Source
dataset size: 200 images; Workers: 600; Payment: $0.02; Plat-
forms: CrowdFlower and Wordsmith. In the first experiment, work-
ers in either condition were required to tag 1 image with 2 key-
words. In Wordsmith, the gamified condition, this corresponded to
advancing 1 level into the game. Players in Wordsmith could con-
tinue playing the game (tagging more images) after completing the
required annotation. There were 200 images in the dataset. Partici-
pants were paid 2 cents for the image tagged.
Experiment 2: Task: Tag 11 images with at least 2 images each;
Source dataset size: 2,200; Workers: 600; Payment: $0.10; Plat-
forms: Crowdflower and Wordsmith; Furtherance Incentives:none,
random or targeted. In experiment 2, workers were required to
tag 11 images with keywords. However, the dataset size was in-
creased 11 fold (from 200 to 2,200) to allow players to play for
longer without seeing repeated images. Intermediate results had
shown a number of players tagged the entire dataset of 200 im-
ages. This experiment consisted of 4 conditions detailed below. In
addition, for conditions 3 and 4, furtherance incentives, defined in
Section 3.4 are introduced when players attempt to quit.
Experiment 2 - Condition 1: Platform: CrowdFlower; Further-
ance Incentives: none. This was a non gamified setup where work-
ers were required to tag 11 images from a dataset of 2,200 images
for 10 cents.
Experiment 2 - Condition 2: Platform: Wordsmith; Furtherance
Incentives: none. In this gamified setup, players were required to
tag 11 images from a dataset of 2,200 images for 10 cents. This
advanced them 2 levels into the game. The players could continue
tagging (playing the game) if they wished.
Experiment 2 - Condition 3: Platform: Wordsmith; Furtherance
Incentives: Random. Identical to Condition 2, except a random
furtherance incentive is presented when a player attempted to exit
the game.
Experiment 2 - Condition 4: Platform: Wordsmith; Furtherance
Incentives: Targeted. Identical to Condition 3, except that the fur-
therance incentive was selected according to the maximum likeli-
hood of user retention using the probabilistic model presented in
Section 3.5.
5. RESULTS
The result of Experiment 1 is summarised in Table 1. The re-
sults show that players (participants in the game condition) sup-
plied more keywords than those in the CrowdFlower condition on
average (97 per image vs 2), and labeling more images overall (32
per worker vs 1), resulting in an overall yield of 41,206 total key-
words vs 1,200 in the control condition. We note that, since the
control condition restricted workers to supply up to two keywords
for a single image, it is unsurprising that individuals in the control
condition provided only two keywords for a single image. How-
ever, in both conditions, individuals were rewarded only up through
the same amount of work (completing the task of supplying 2 key-
words for a single image), and thus the additional work done in the
Wordsmith condition was not financially incentivised and done for
free. Moreover, compared to the control, the experimental condi-
tion yielded significantly more new keywords, which we define to
be keywords that were not in the original gold standard seed, but
achieved the requisite threshold of inter-annotator agreement. The
average inter-annotator agreement, computed as described in 4.3
over all images for the control condition was also much less than
that of the experimental condition (5.72% vs 37.7%). The control
condition achieved 42.9% coverage of the original gold standard
label set, while the experimental condition covered 52.5%.
Table 2 summarises the results for Experiment 2. Again, com-
pared with the CrowdFlower interface, all game conditions saw
much greater output, both in terms of labels per image (average
40,510 keywords across game conditions vs 13,200 in the control
condition) and number of images tagged (30 images labeled per
worker across game conditions vs 11) despite monetary compensa-
tion being held constant between conditions (10 cents to complete
11 images with 2 labels each). Examining the game conditions
only, conditions 3 and 4 which featured furtherance incentives on
exit attempt resulted in players performing more labels on average
(31.5 vs 27) than condition 2, which had no furtherance incentives.
We note that due to the much larger source dataset of images, the
likelihood that two workers would be presented the same image is
much lower, resulting overall in noisier inter-rater agreement and
lower coverage of gold-standard labels.
To analyse player response to furtherance incentives, Table 4 shows
the number of players who responded to each furtherance incentive
stimulus type at various levels of play (image bands). To clarify,
we considered a player to be responding to the incentive stimulus
when, upon attempting to quit the game and being presented with a
furtherance incentive, decided to tag at least 1 extra image prior to
exiting. The table shows the number of responses of the number of
presentations of each stimuli for each (C3 random and C4 targeted)
condition at 5 image image bands, corresponding to the number
of images previously tagged when attempting to exit. Comparing
randomised to targeted incentive, the results show greater response
to furtherance incentives when delivered in the targeted incentive
condition (C4) than randomised (C3). In the targeted incentives
condition, 77% of players went on to tag at least 1 more image,
compared with only 27% in the randomised condition.
With respect to furtherance incentive type, direct comparison is in
Table 4 due to the fact that the number of stimulus presentations
differ for different types and conditions. We constructed Table 3 to
make this comparison further, which simply shows a breakdown,
by type, of all successful furtherance incentive stimulus responses.
As can be seen, in both C3 (Randomised) and C4 (Targeted), the
Power and Money incentives made up the top two successful in-
centives, with Money comprising the largest share of the targeted
successes. We discuss these results in the next section.
Experiment 1
Metric CrowdFlower
(control)
Wordsmith (ex-
perimental)
Total workers 600 423
Total keywords 1,200 41,206
New keywords 111 5,708
Avg. agreement 5.72% 37.7%
Gold keywords 42.92% 52.53%
Mean Imgs/person 1 32
Max Imgs/person 1 200
Table 1: Experiment 1 Results - High level results for Experi-
ment 1, comparing number of keywords and images tagged in
the gamified (Wordsmith) condition compared to the standard
CrowdFlower interface.
Experiment 2
CrowdFlower (Non-
gamified)
Wordsmith (Gamified)
C1: No furtherance C2: No furtherance C3: Random further-
ance
C4: Targeted further-
ance
Total workers 600 514 543 454
Total keywords 13,200 35,890 47,418 38,223
New keywords 1,323 4,091 5,435 4,849
Avg. agreement 6.32% 10.90% 10.16% 9.86%
Gold keywords 48.42% 45.02% 41.21% 47.10%
Mean Imgs/person 11 27 33 30
Max. Imgs/person 11 351 501 540
Table 2: Experiment 2 Results - High level summary of work output and quality comparing non-gamified (C1) and gamified (C2, C3,
C4) conditions.
Image
Band
11 12-60 61-100 101-200 201-2,200
Random Targeted Random Targeted Random Targeted Random Targeted Random Targeted
Power 26.67%
(4/15)
70.97%
(22/31)
33.33%
(9/27)
74.68%
(59/79)
55.55%
(5/9)
80.95%
(17/21)
25.00%
(2/8)
100.00%
(5/5)
100.00%
(3/3)
61.54%
(8/13)
Money 23.53%
(4/17)
88.24%
(75/85)
34.78%
(8/23)
77.57%
(83/107)
66.67%
(2/3)
100.00%
(2/2)
40.00%
(2/5)
100.00%
(6/6)
0.00%
(0/0)
100.00%
(5/5)
Leaderboard 21.43%
(3/14)
0.00%
(0/1)
10.00%
(3/30)
70.00%
(7/10)
33.33%
(1/3)
100.00%
(1/1)
70.00%
(7/10)
57.14%
(12/21)
75.00%
(3/4)
100.00%
(1/1)
Levels 13.04%
(3/23)
40.00%
(2/5)
18.18%
(6/33)
69.57%
(16/23)
75.00%
(3/4)
100.00%
(3/3)
16.67%
(1/6)
100.00%
(3/3)
100.00%
(2/2)
100.00%
(3/3)
Badges 0.00%
(0/0)
0.00%
(0/1)
22.22%
(4/18)
63.63%
(7/11)
16.67%
(1/6)
100.00%
(3/3)
66.67%
(4/6)
90%
(9/10)
66.67%
(2/3)
75.00%
(3/4)
Access 11.76%
(2/17)
0.00%
(0/0)
17.24%
(5/29)
33.33%
(5/15)
33.33%
(3/9)
50.00%
(2/4)
20.00%
(1/5)
100.00%
(3/3)
100.00%
(1/1)
100.00%
(6/6)
Table 4: Furtherance Incentive responses (Results of Experiment 2 Condition 3 & 4) Percentage of players in who responded to each
Furtherance Incentive broken down by type (Power, Money, Leaderboard, Levels, Badges and Access), and condition (randomised
vs targeted). The number of incentive prompts delivered for each type are listed by the responded percentage.
Incentive C3: Randomised C4: Targeted
Power 26.09% 30.16%
Money 19.65% 46.17%
Leaderboard 16.59% 5.71%
Levels 13.01% 7.34%
Badges 13.04% 5.98%
Access 11.61% 4.35%
Table 3: Incentive Response Distribution - Successful further-
ance incentives stimuli broken down by type, for both C3 (ran-
domised) and C4 (targeted) conditions.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this section, we first briefly re-visit our results in the context
of the research hypotheses, discussing limitations in the process.
We then discuss implications of our findings to crowdsourcing, and
conclude with a summary of ongoing and future work.
The results show support for all three of our research hypotheses.
With respect to H1, players in the game condition unilaterally per-
formed more tasks even when they were not explicitly incentivised
with monetary reward to do so. In addition, output was of higher
quality, showing support for H2, both when measured in terms of
diversity (new words with high agreement) and achieved consistent
coverage of the gold standard labels than the control condition. In
particular, we saw no support for overjustification in these results,
which would have been manifest in reduced productivity with the
introduction of game elements.
One limitation of our experimental design is that, since the num-
ber of contributions in the control interface was clamped while
the game condition was not (meaning they could contribute in-
definitely), it is not meaningful to quantify the increased volume
of work between the control and gamification conditions. How-
ever, we can compare quality differences (which showed significant
gains), and volume differences among just the game conditions in
Experiment 2, when targeted furtherance incentives were shown to
yield higher volumes of work than randomised ones (H3).
However, perhaps more significantly, this study demonstrated that
even simple furtherance incentivisation methods do work towards
getting players to complete more tasks. In all but the Money fur-
therance incentive condition, such methods worked to increase out-
put at no extra cost. Moreover, we found that among furtherance in-
centivisation strategies, those that were more social generally fared
better than those that were personal; for example, the Power incen-
tive was presented "You would be rewarded with the power to view
other players’ tags", while the Leaderboard incentive promised par-
ticipants a higher place on the leaderboard, which was visible to
everyone. This agrees with previous work in GWAPs such as the
the ESP Game, in particular [26]) in which social incentives were
shown to be among the most powerful. Most human computation
environments, like Mechanical Turk, CrowdFlower and citizen sci-
ence projects still lack elements that promote social visibility that
might improve engagement.
The effectiveness of money as an effective furtherance incentive
was somewhat surprising, given the fact that most participants al-
ready performed free labour, that is, work beyond the minimum that
was asked of them to get their initial reward. Therefore, it could
be concluded that these participants were motivated to do this ad-
ditional work for other reasons. However, when financial reward
is re-introduced as a furtherance incentive, it effectively motivated
people to complete more work. Further analysis is required to un-
derstand to what extent such monetary rewards could compel con-
tinued participation, and the optimal amounts of reward for doing
so.
As our experiments only tested one type of crowdsourced task and
GWAP, namely image labeling, the results may not necessarily ap-
ply to all task types. In particular, tasks that require high cogni-
tive load, require significant time investment or creative thought
may not benefit from game mechanics due to their intensive nature.
Moreover, those kinds of crowdsourced tasks driven by strong in-
trinsic motivations (such as citizen science, disaster relief, and so
on) are unlikely to substantially benefit from these results because
such motivations will probably overshadow the simpler incentives
tested here. Moreover, such intrinsic motivation settings have been
shown to be more prone to overjustification effects, and thus may
result in actually reduced participation. We wish to test whether
such effects will become present in such settings in future experi-
ments.
Among our ongoing efforts, we wish to better understand how and
why the incentives work in the ways and to the extent that they
do. In particular, we believe that furtherance incentives could be
more effective if carefully distributed within the game mechanics
so that they appear at appropriate intervals when motivation begins
to wane, not only after the participant has initiated an attempt to
leave.
Second, we wish to the improve the probabilistic model to take into
account other aspects of players’ performance, task history and de-
mographic, and to understand the ways in estimating appropriate
rewards. In particular, we wish to run further experiments to de-
termine whether incentives are more effective for particular demo-
graphics than for others, or for workers at particular skill levels or
task completion histories.
In addition, we would like to investigate further social effects of
furtherance incentives. In this experiment, levels and badges were
merely to mark a player’s own progress; however, these might be
made more effective if such rewards were made visible to other
players and seen as a form of status. Such status has been shown to
effectively encourage participation in online communities [17] and
may translate well to microtask environments as well. Moreover,
all of the incentives we applied in this experiment were positive,
individual incentives; we next wish to explore the effectiveness of
other types of incentives such as positive social incentives (e.g.,
members of an entire group get a reward), as well as negative incen-
tives both as in-game elments and furtherance incentives. Finally,
we would like to understand the span of furtherance incentives, and
potential avenues for extending the effects of such incentives in var-
ious ways.
In summary, our results have shown that very adding gamification
to crowdsourced micro-tasks that already have external incentives
can improve the quality and quantity of work completed. Our re-
sults complement previous work comparing purely gamified and
paid crowdsourcing, and extend previous results with a look at
multiple kinds of furtherance incentives, combined with reward
adaptation. Although we have shown social incentives and sup-
plemental monetary rewards outperform other such incentives, and
demonstrated a simple probabilistic model able to outperform a
randomised strategy, we believe that we have only begun to un-
derstand the relationships that such incentives have on subjective
worker experience and sustained engagement in the long term, and
plan to continue to pursue such investigations in the future.
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